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A DEFENSE OF COMMON LAW
ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE DISCOVERY
OF BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Henry N. Butler t

ABSTRACT
A major problem with the current environmental regulatory
regime is that it does not provide a reliableprocess for determining
or discovering either the optimal amount of pollution or the most
efficient means for achieving the selected level of pollution. This
Article explains how the common law process, when coupled with
competitive federalism, spontaneously leads to the discovery of better
environmental policy. This analysis suggests that common law rules
should be the presumptively optimal method of controlling local
environmental harms. Common law processes allow for greater
experimentation and innovation than do set and rigidstatutory rules.
Unlike rigid rules, the common law provides opportunities to adjust
to changes in technology and societalpreferences and to learnfrom
experience. Part of the adjustment process is through private
contracting. The common law evolves by self-correcting policy
mistakes, whereas there are no such self-correcting mechanisms in
centralizedcommand-and-controlregulations.Command-and-control
bureaucratsand legislatorsare often oblivious to changes inherent in
a dynamic world, but common law environmentalism and
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acknowledges the hospitality and generous support of PERC-the Property and Environment
Research Center-in Bozeman, Montana where he was a Julian Simon Fellow during the
Summer of 2006. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Jonathan Adler,
Terry Anderson, Steven Eagle, Donald Kochan, Bobby McCormick, Roger Meiners, Bruce
Yandle, and participants in the PERC workshop in August 2007.
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jurisdictionalcompetition provide a dynamic process through which
policy options are discovered and discardedin response to the reality
of perpetual changes in technology and political preferences. The
current regulatory regime is strengthened and reinforced by the
common law-but making badpolicy stronger is not a logical reason
for championing the common law. The current regulatory regime
constrains the evolution of the common law and thus limits the ability
of the common law to evolve and discover better environmental
policy. The benefits of common law environmentalism are likely to be
even greater when coupled with devolution of authority to the states,
thereby allowing greater opportunities for experimentation and
learningfrom otherjurisdictions. Many of the standardcriticisms of
common law environmentalism are overstated In particular, the
common law failure that motivated federal intervention is largely
irrelevant to currentdebates about the virtue of the common law.
INTRODUCTION

Widespread dissatisfaction with centralized command-and-control
environmental regulation has lead to numerous reform proposals and
some policy changes.1 Policy changes include devolution, greater
reliance on cost-benefit analysis, marketable pollution permits,
brownfields legislation and many more. 2 Perhaps the most sweeping
reform proposal is to abandon most federal environmental regulation
in favor of a return to the common law.3
I See HENRY N. BUTLER AND JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks
Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988); Todd J. Zywicki,
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1999) ("With the fall of the
Soviet Union, the current environmental regulatory structure in America has been characterized
as one of the largest centralized, command-and-control planning structures still in existence.");
K.A. Taipale, Information Technology as Agent of Change in Environmental Policy, CAS
Working Paper No. 05-2003 (2003), available at http://information-retrieval.info/papers/
agentofchange.pdf.
2 For a summary of reform proposals, see JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY, 48-49,
665-66 (6th ed., 2006).
3 For a description of common law environmentalism, see THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(Roger Meiners & Andrew Morriss eds., 2000); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 161 (1977) quoting MICHAEL GREVE, THE DEMISE OF

ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICA 115 (1996), ("By common law I do not mean the historical
common law[.] I have in mind the basic logic of a legal system whose principal purpose lies in
protecting private orderings. Such a system guarantees robust individual rights to exclude others
(property); provides avenues for voluntary exchange (contracts); and protects against aggression
by outsiders (torts)."); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of
Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 959-960 (1999); Free market
environmentalism provides the intellectual foundation for common law environmentalism. See
TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (Rev. ed.
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Common law environmentalism has been harshly criticized. 4 To
most environmental groups, law professors, policy makers, and
environmental law practitioners, the proposition that devolution to the
states and a greater reliance on the common law could increase

environmental quality is preposterous. Many commentators do not
take this proposal seriously because of their belief that it was the
failure of state common law that necessitated federal legislation.

Moreover, common law actions are thought to be inadequate for the
large numbers of plaintiffs involved in many environmental actions.
These criticisms and concerns about common law environmentalism
are not surprising because such a return to historical principles seems
out of step with a modem industrial world.5 Nevertheless, given the
longstanding and widespread dissatisfaction with the current

centralized regulatory regime, it is time to seriously consider the
common law as an alternative institutional arrangement for protecting
environmental assets.6
A major problem with the current regulatory regime is that it does

not provide a reliable process for determining or discovering either
the optimal amount of pollution or the most efficient means for
achieving the selected level of pollution. This Article explains how

the common law process, when coupled with competitive federalism,
spontaneously leads to the discovery of better environmental policy.
This analysis suggests that the common law should be the
presumptively optimal method of controlling environmental harms.

Common law processes allow for greater experimentation and
innovation than do set and rigid statutory rules. Unlike rigid rules, the
common law provides opportunities to adjust to changes in
7
technology and societal preferences and to learn from experience.

2001). For additional resources on free market environmentalism and common law
environmentalism, visit the website for PERC-the Property and Environment Research
Center-http://www.perc.org.
4 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Common Law Conceits: A Comment on Meiners & Yandle, 7
GEO.MASON L. REV. 965 (1999).
5

See YANDLE, COMMON SENSE, supra note 3, at 161.

6 Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State,
92 Iowa L. Rev. 545, 548 (2007) (describing "recent efforts by plaintiffs, particularly state and
local government plaintiffs, to push state common law to address modem concerns and
compensate for perceived failures by the federal executive and legislative branches in
environmental protection.").
7 As Holmes states, the common law's systematic function serves these functions:
It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular result,
but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
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Indeed, the common law allows for private ordering to avoid rules
that impose greater costs than benefits to some parties. The common
law evolves by self-correcting policy mistakes, whereas there are no
such self-correcting mechanisms in centralized command-and-control
regulations. Moreover, the benefits of common law environmentalism
are likely to be even greater when coupled with devolution of
authority to the states thereby allowing greater opportunities for
experimentation and learning from other jurisdictions.
Part I presents a brief summary of the importance to economic
policy analysts of knowing the optimal level of pollution and then
explains why it is impossible to determine the optimal level of
pollution. Of course, politics can determine the target level of
pollution, but that is not necessarily related to the optimal amount of
pollution and it is subject to political shenanigans, such as rentseeking and bureaucratic empire building. Moreover, different
institutions-the judiciary or legislatures-can result in different
answers to the question of the permitted amount of pollution. The
common law does not set out to determine the optimal level of
pollution, but spontaneously evolves toward it through market-like
interaction. In this sense, the common law process helps "discover"
better environmental policies.
Part II addresses several arguments concerning the use of
federalism and the common law to provide environmental protection.
The impetus for federal intervention was the alleged failure of the
common law to adequately protect the environment prior to 1970.
Public awareness and preferences toward the protection of
environmental resources has changed dramatically since that time,
and current policy analysts should not be particularly concerned about
the common law failing to adequately protect the environment in
many areas. Moreover, the common law process offers numerous
benefits as a dynamic system that can evolve in response to changes
in preferences, technology, and so forth. Part II concludes that the
current regulatory regime could be improved with a healthy dose of
the common law. Indeed, the groups and individuals who should be
most afraid of dismantling the current system are not necessarily
those who truly value the environment but those whose personal self-

rules by which men should be governed .... In order to know what [the law] is, we
must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW & OTHER WRITINGS I (Legal Classics

Library ed. 1982); see also Jason J. Czamezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of
Environmental Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) ("[T]he advantages of
the common law, at least in some circumstances, are substantial.").
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interest is tied to the current system. Citizens would be the
beneficiaries of this model for environmental policymaking, not their
bureaucratic agents who benefit from the perpetuation of
governmental controls.
Part III presents an argument for the presumption that common
law environmentalism does an effective job of controlling many
potential environmental problems. The starting point is a simple
evolutionary model of jurisdictional choice with unconstrained choice
of regulatory approaches. This model suggests that allowing
jurisdictions to opt for common law environmental protections would
not be the environmental disaster that is often presumed. The logic of
policy arguments in favor of substituting common law processes for
bureaucratic regulatory processes is straightforward: the current
regulatory system is incredibly wasteful and inefficient with topdown policies and bureaucratic command-and-control; the common
law, contrary to myth, actually did a fairly good job of protecting the
environment; thus, environmental protection could be improved by
dismantling parts of the current regulatory structure and replacing it
with common law processes. 8 Implicit in these proposals is the
devolution of the determination of substantive environmental
standards to states and state courts where most common law doctrine
has traditionally been created. The framework developed in Part III
prescribes an allocation of regulatory authority that matches
jurisdictions with the geographic scope of the pollution externality. 9
Local jurisdictions would then be unconstrained in selecting the
regulatory response that best suits the preferences of their
constituents. The goal of such competitive federalism is to create a
dynamic discovery process through which multiple jurisdictions
experiment with alternative responses to environmental problems.
Part IV considers the practical implications of the analysis, and
proposes specific procedural and substantive changes that should be
adopted in order to capture the benefits of common law
environmentalism. Specific policy recommendations include limiting
the scope of federal environmental regulation, prohibiting federal
regulatory preemption of local law (regulations or common law),
providing for a state common law defense to actions under federal

I Meiners & Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy,
supra note 3, at 959-960.
9 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathon R. Macey, Pollution, Externalities and The Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 23, 25 (1996) (suggesting that the regulating jurisdiction should be no larger than the
geographic scope of the activity).
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regulations, unfettered local choice of environmental policy
instruments, and civil justice reforms.
The article concludes by explaining that discovering better
environmental policy requires a rediscovery of the benefits of the
common law.
I. COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTALISM AS A DISCOVERY PROCESS

The economic analysis of environmental policy often begins with a
consideration of externalities°--spillovers or third-party effects that
may prevent markets from achieving the socially optimal level of an
activity. If polluters are able to disregard the costs they impose on
third parties, then polluters' decisions do not reflect the full costs of
production. This externalization of costs of production is often due to
poorly defined property rights (e.g., the neighbor does not have legal
recourse against the polluter) or high transactions costs (e.g., the
neighbors face a collective action problem in collecting funds to pay
the polluter to stop polluting). Many socially beneficial activities
produce negative externalities. If environmental policy---either
common law or statutes-prohibited all negative externalities, then
many socially beneficial activities would be banned and almost all
activities would be curtailed. However, both the common law and
statutory law attempt to balance the costs and benefits of socially
productive activities that produce externalities, and thus recognize
that the optimal amount of pollution is not zero. A challenging
practical problem then is the determination of the optimal amount of
pollution. This Part offers a brief overview of the problems that
policy analysts face in determining--or discovering-the optimal
amount of pollution.
A. Welfare Economics and the Need to Know
The economic goal of environmental policy is to force producers
of externalities to internalize those costs into their decisionmaking.

10As Dukeminier and Krier explain:
Externalities exist whenever some person, say X, makes a decision about how to use
resources without taking full account of the effects of the decision. X ignores some of
the effects-some of the costs or benefits that would result from a particular activity,
for example-because they fall on others. They are "external" to X, hence the label
externalities. As a consequence of externalities, resources tend to be misused or
"misallocated" which is to say used in one way when another would make society as
a whole better off.
DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (emphasis in original).
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Ideally, producers' private decisions regarding how much to produce
(and thus how much to pollute) will be based on costs that reflect all
social costs of their actions. Such internalization results in an optimal
trade-off of the benefits of productive, extemality-creating activities
and external costs imposed on third parties.
In broadest terms, environmental policy needs to determine the
acceptable amount of pollution. In economic theory, the optimal
amount of pollution is simply the level where the marginal social
benefit of the productive activity is equal to the marginal social cost
(including externalities) of the activity. Inconveniently, determining
the optimal amount of pollution is fraught with difficulties. For
example, the external costs of the incremental amount of pollution
can vary dramatically from area to area because of different
population density, different preferences, different preexisting levels
of pollution, different geological and atmospheric conditions, and so
forth. Thus, there is no clear, practical methodology for determining
the optimal amount of pollution in the real world. In practice, politics
determines the permissible amount of pollution. Yet it would be a
misleading tautology to conclude that the politically determined result
is optimal simply because it has been politically determined.
The simplest regulatory approach to pollution is to tax polluters an
amount equal to the marginal negative externality imposed by the
pollution and then allow the market to clear. The goal of such a
Pigovian excise tax is to force polluters to internalize the external
costs of their pollution. By paying the tax to pollute, producers make
profit-maximizing decisions that reflect the external costs. In theory,
Pigovian taxes are clear and straightforward. They solve the market
failure by giving producers incentives to act as if they were paying for
all the resources used. However, in practice, it is virtually impossible
for policy makers to accurately determine the appropriate amount of
the tax for every producer-which by its nature will vary from
industry to industry, producer to producer and location to location.
A logical extension of the Pigovian welfare analysis is for
government regulation to declare the optimal level of pollution and
the means by which to control it. This command-and-control
approach relies on an expert centralized bureaucracy to prescribe
acceptable levels of pollution and mandate the use of specified
technologies to limit pollution. U.S. environmental regulation has
traditionally relied on this approach--one which has been subject to
harsh criticism for many years. In general, bureaucrats do not and
cannot have the information necessary to make informed decisions
about the optimal amount of pollution nor the most efficient means
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for achieving the optimal amount." This observation is accurate even
when bureaucrats are assumed to be loyal agents of the public
interest-an assumption that strays far from reality. In the end,
command-and-control decisions seem arbitrary and subject to
political shenanigans. Indeed, in many contexts, the command-andcontrol approach often does not even define acceptable levels of
ambient pollution to which people are exposed, and instead focuseson
the level of emissions that given facilities can emit. This means that
enforcement and compliance often focus on emissions rules instead of
actual exposures and harms.
A major improvement in the operation of the command-andcontrol regime has been the use of market-based regulations. Marketbased regulations are designed to improve regulatory performance by
giving regulated firms the incentives to find innovative and lowercost means of achieving a given level of environmental quality than
can be attained under command-and-control regulation. The best
example of market-based regulations in action is tradable pollution
permits. Other examples include conservation easements, tax
incentives, and compensatory mitigation. Although market-based
regulations provide incentives to discover creative ways to lower the
cost of compliance with specified permissible levels of pollution, they
do not help answer the vexing policy question of the optimal level of
pollution.
B. Coase, Common Law, and Private Ordering
Ronald Coase turned the Pigovian welfare economics analysis of
externalities on its head with his seminal article in 1960.12 Coase
explained the reciprocal nature of many so-called externalities and
argued that private contracting often solved many conflicting use
issues without need for governmental intervention. In this view, the
primary role of government is to clearly define property rights and
provide a mechanism for enforcing property rights and related
contracts. The more complete the specification of property rights and
the lower the costs of transactions, the more closely the market
outcome will be to the socially optimal outcome. That is, the optimal
amount of pollution is discovered through the enforcement of
property rights and market interaction.

" Bruce Yandle, "Coase, Pigou, and Enviornmental Rights," in Who Owns the
Environment, Peter J. Hill and Roger E. Meiners, eds. (Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 119.
128-132, 152.
12Ronald Coase, The Problemof Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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Building
on the
Coasian
perspective,
free
market
environmentalism stresses the role of property rights, markets and
contracts in solving environmental problems. 13 Common law
environmentalism is a logical extension of free market
environmentalism. In order to be effective, property rights must be
enforceable thorough a court system that recognizes traditional
common law actions of contracts, property and torts.' 4
Unlike regulatory approaches to the environment, which must
confront the question of the optimal amount of pollution, the common
law process that underlies common law environmentalism is not
explicitly concerned with determining the optimal amount of
pollution. Common law rules are developed over time by interaction
of numerous self-interested litigants in an adversarial process. Judicial
decisions by literally thousands of judges from hundreds of
jurisdictions are synthesized into common law rules. Common law
environmentalism rests on the assumption that the incentives of
litigants to bring forth relevant information will force common law
rules to reflect the trade-off of relevant costs and benefits. 15 The
13 See generally ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 3.
14 See
15

generally YANDLE, COMMON SENSE, supra note 3.
Professor Keith Hylton has explained the role of private information in the common law

process:
As Holmes suggested and Posner later argued explicitly, the negligence system is a
large regulatory scheme that has worked with some success. Negligence liability
works as a deterrent and it has not driven legitimate activity out of the country. The
crucial feature that I want to highlight is its reliance on private information. The
plaintiff knows more about his injury than any other party. The defendant knows
more about his burden of precaution than anyone else. The negligence system gives
both parties an incentive to persuade the court that their version of the appropriate
regulatory rule is appropriate. Courts use their common knowledge, as well as
information provided by the parties, to decide which parties' version is more
persuasive, and to determine general conduct norms that will apply to future cases. In
some cases, such as custom, a bright line rule favoring some defendants has
emerged. In others, e.g., res ipsa doctrine, a rule favoring plaintiffs has emerged.
What emerges from negligence litigation is a set of conduct norms that are shaped by
the private information of parties. Although courts decide only the individual cases
in front of them, the decisions create precedents that shape specific conduct norms
that apply to future cases. A decision that a firm, or a professional, is not negligent in
conforming to industry custom is both a regulatory rule and a judgment based on an
assessment of private information in one case. The court's decision to uphold the
custom is inseparable from its examination of the information brought in by the
parties.
A public regulatory scheme could not hope to match the negligence system in terms
of its scope, detail, and encapsulation of private information. To do so would require
public agents to discover ex ante how much a potential victim would be hurt by a
specific injury, and how much it would cost a potential injurer to avoid the injury.
Even if the parties were able to provide this information ex ante, their incentives to
do so honestly would be weak.
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common law makes facts matter, and allows for flexibility between
them. Blanket regulation cannot do so.
Because property rights are often difficult to define and transaction
costs are high, the ability of the common law to force the
internalization of all externalities is less than perfect. However, as
Harold Demsetz has explained, reality-based policy analysis should
not be concerned with the pursuit of perfection but instead should
focus on the relative benefits of alternative institutional
arrangements.' 6 The comparative institutional approach employed in
this article considers the merits of common law environmentalism in
a decentralized system relative to the predominant alternative of
centralized command and control.
It is also important to recognize the role of private ordering in the
discovery and evolution of the common law. Although most common
law doctrine is created in state courts, it is likely that the underlying
rules are often created as much, if not more, in the myriad voluntary
transactions that occur privately to help define and create the rights
and expectations that common law courts are called upon to further
define and enforce. Thus, a great deal of common law discovery
results from the private ordering that common law rules facilitate.

The common law approach to environmental regulation, in large part embodied in
nuisance law, reflects considerable sensitivity to private, local information.
Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41
Washburn L.J. 515, 524-25 (2002). One major criticism by Professor Frank Cross is that
evidentiary rules (presumably primarily those regarding relevancy, FED. R. EvID. 401-403)
allow parties to exclude information about the broader social consequences of a particular rule,
thereby limiting the ability of the court to make efficient policy judgments. Frank B. Cross,
Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law, U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No.
063 (2005) available at http://ssm.com/abstract=812464 ("The economic value of the law rests
largely in externalities, setting rules for future events. Yet the common law judicial process
strictly excludes relevant evidence of such externalities. Rules of evidence may exclude judges
from even considering information about the broader societal implications of the doctrines that
they establish.").
16 Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1
(1969) ("The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the
relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing 'mperfect' institutional arrangement.
This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which
the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements. In practice, those who
adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real and if
discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Users of the comparative
institution approach attempt to assess which alternative real institutional arrangement seems best
able to cope with the economic problem; practitioners of this approach may use an ideal norm to
provide standards from which divergences are assessed . . . and select as efficient that
alternative which seems most likely to minimize the divergence.").
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C. Mistakes and Self-CorrectingMechanisms
Environmental policymakers-whether common law judges,
legislators or bureaucrats--occasionally make mistakes. They may
overregulate, underregulate, overcompensate, undercompensate,
ignore sound science, admit junk science and so forth. In a centralized
regulatory system, there are very few institutional forces to correct
mistakes in environmental policy. And, experience has shown that it
is particularly difficult to undo clear cases of overregulation. In a
decentralized regulatory system, jurisdictional competition can
improve environmental regulation by giving policy makers the
political incentives to improve polices through experimentation,
observation and learning across jurisdictions-the jurisdictional
comparison makes costs and benefits more transparent. However,
even under jurisdictional competition, the ability of state and local
regulations to determine the optimal level of pollution would continue
to be hampered by their inability to capture and assimilate relevant
information. The common law, however, with its information rich
process is more likely to identify and correct mistakes.
The common law develops through Darwinian forces.' 7 Bad or
inefficient decisions are eventually weeded out of the system. This
can happen through continuous challenge in the originating
jurisdiction or simply by the refusal of other jurisdictions to follow
the rule. 18 The common law process tends to self-correct if a rule is
out of line. Similarly, if conditions have changed so that a rule is no
longer appropriate, the same forces will push the law to change.19 In
this way, the common law process spontaneously discovers better
environmental law.
Appreciation of the discovery process inherent in the common law
should make policy analysts more tolerant of deviations from (what
they deem to be) the ideal or optimal environmental policy. Indeed, it
is unlikely that any process will ever reach the theoretical optimal
1 For discussion of the various scholarly views of the common law process, see Todd J.
Zywicki, The Rise and Fallof Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW.
U.L. REv. 1551 (2003) and Cross, Identifying Virtues of the Common Law, supra note 14.
i8 See discussion of Peeveyhouse v. Garland Coal Company in Andrew P. Morriss,
Lessons for EnvironmentalLaw from the American Codification Debate, in THE COMMON LAW
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 144.
19 See Hylton, supra note 14, at 527 ("Although nuisance law does not aim to generate
global emission standards, nothing in this framework suggests that this could not be the result.
As a population grows richer, it will demand more in terms of environmental quality. The
comparison of expected externalized costs and externalized benefits will change over time in
favor of stricter regulations ....
In this sense nuisance law can be viewed as a regulatory
framework that encourages development in early phases, and then places greater restrictions as
the demand for environmental quality increases.").
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policy in a dynamic world. The process may move toward the
optimum-yet may never obtain it. There may be extended periods
during which the law appears to be wrong.
D. Common Law Processesversus Statutory Regulation
U.S. environmental regulation has traditionally relied on a
centralized bureaucracy to prescribe acceptable levels of pollution
and mandate the use of specified technologies to limit pollution.
Polluters are required to comply with regulations, often without
regard to the relative costs and benefits of compliance. The current
command-and-control regime has been subject to harsh criticism for
many years.
Historically, environmental legislation is still in its infancy-but
the common law applications of property, tort, and contract law that
can serve environmental concerns are mature. "Environmental
protection was not a distinct field of law before 1970. Since that time
it has become a growth industry and has enjoyed widespread political
support[.],, 20 Yet this "growth industry" has evolved with a general
abandonment of the efficiencies of the common law. 2'
Some of the shortcomings of the current environmental regulatory
regime are particularly glaring when compared with the common law.
Where the federal rules are rigid and applied to all parties regardless
of the specific circumstances, the application of the common law
begins with an analysis of the facts of the specific alleged harm.
Where the federal rules are imposed even if no party has been
demonstrated harm, the common law requires an injured party to be
harmed by the violation of a duty. These observations provide a
starting point for a brief consideration of22the benefits of common law
processes relative to statutory regulation.

20

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 275 (1995).

21 Meiners & Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental
Policy,supra note 3, at 925 ("The common law, combined with various state-level controls, was
doing a better job addressing most environmental problems than the federal monopoly, which
directed most environmental policy for the last part of this century.").
22 Hylton, supra note 14, at 515 ("There are two broad models of regulation: statutory
schemes carried out by administrative agencies with the help of public enforcement agents, and
highly discretionary common law rules developed over time through litigation. Environmental
regulation is dominated by the fast model, with relatively little of it done through litigation of
tort claims. The reason may be largely historical: tort law has always been viewed as local in
design and impact, while environmental law has always had a global aim. But it need not be this
way. More than anything, tort law has been flexible, and thus capable of responding to new
problems.... [T]ort law has some important properties that make it superior to statute-based
regulatory schemes as a system of environmental protection.").
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1. The Common Law Reflects Norms
The common law tends to reflect societal norms.23 The common
law filters regulation according to these norms while top-down
regulation lacks such flexibility. Moreover, if norms vary from one
jurisdiction to another, the common law can reflect those differences
24
much more accurately than centralized statutory regulation.
2. The Common Law FacilitatesPrivate Ordering
One of the biggest differences between the common law and
regulatory systems is the ability of individuals and groups to engage
in voluntary transactions to address environmental concerns and
thereby avoid litigation or other disputes. This occurs in the common

law context because common law actions are based upon discrete
rights that can be traded. In the regulatory system, by contrast, there
are no rights that can be traded, either because the system does not
recognize rights, or because it creates nearly infinite rights through
citizen suit programs. The common law creates default rules that can
be bargained around, whereas regulatory systems typically preempt
alternative arrangements. Moreover, the common law process itself
furthers greater definition of these rights, whereas the regulatory
system does the opposite.25
3. Common Law Evolution versus Statutory Revolution
The common law also evolves slowly as it adapts to exogenous
changes by overturning precedents that no longer fit economic
23 Professor Frank Cross also cites this feature as a strong attribute of the "bottom-up"
approach of the common law. Cross, Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law, supra note 14,
at 5 ("The 'bottom up' approach may also be more likely to draw upon existing social
understandings and norms in the development of law, which may in turn be more effective.")
(citation omitted). In considering the relative merits of the common law and statutory regulatory
law, David Schoenbrod states: "[Tihe common law enforces the norms of society, whereas the
administrative state tries to impose intellectually generated norms on society. Common law
rules tend to limit liability to conduct that society deems unjust, whereas the administrative state
imposes liability where the state deems it useful to achieve its objectives." David Schoenbrod,
Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of the Common Law, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 17-18.
24See Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment, supra note 22, at 6-19; YANDLE,
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, supra note 3, at 164-5. ("Localized information and
localized control are part of the efficiencies that a reliance on common law brings to the table
for environmental protection. Common law allows the system to get closer to the source, and it
allows more targeted attention than a top-down federal regulatory regime. Although it is
debated, the common law can be argued to bring environmental protection closer to the
source-a means of avoiding the inefficiencies of centralization.")
25See Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 73-78 (2001).
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conditions or societal norms. The common law process is dynamic
and spontaneous, yet orderly.26 As Keith Hylton notes, "[m]ore than
anything, tort law has been flexible, and thus capable of responding to
new problems. 27 As discussed above, the common law
spontaneously evolves in response to changing circumstances.
In contrast, environmental statutes have been hastily enacted in
response to crises and environmental disasters. Such statutory
revolutions tend to become rigid and irreversible once interest groups
capture the regulatory process.28 Even statutory regulations that were
initially "optimal" are unlikely to remain so as tastes, preferences,
wealth and technology change. There are no self-correcting or self26 Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law:
An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 1002-1003 (1996) ("[B]ecause common
law rules develop concurrently with the evolution of society, the direction and timing of change
are fairly predictable. The law responds to the demands of those subject to it."). For a theoretical
explanation of spontaneous order, see 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY 93-97 (1979); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 22-70 (1960).

See also Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of the Common Law, 115 J. POL.
ECON'Y 43, 43 (2007) ("We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges
influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a
benefit of diversity in judicial views. Policy-motivated judges distort the law away from
efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law's
precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by
personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases
and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the
evolutionary adaptability of the common law.").
27 Hylton, supra note 14, at 515. See generally Ray Kirsch, Note, What's the Buzz?
Common Law for the Commons in Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources, 29
HAMLINE L. REV. 338 (2006).
28 Michael Greve has noted:
The tendency for environmental statutes to become playing fields for interest groups
and politicians has disturbing implications. As a practical matter, it means that
environmental regulation becomes even more rigid and immune to reform. Even as
we learn from the failures of the past, and even as the need for reform becomes more
urgent, we will be stuck with statutes and regulations that are no longer sustained by
any plausible environmental rationale.
Michael S. Greve, Environmental Politics Without Romance, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS: PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE REWARDS 1, 12 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr.

eds., 1992), cited in Zywicki, supra note 1,at 913. Anderson and Leal also explain the potential
pitfalls of a governmental regulatory solution due to interest group influence:
Because the costs of bringing together those who use a marine environment are often
high enough to prevent joint action against polluters, a case can be made for some
regulatory authority .. . to control the level of pollution. Of course, one of the
problems with government control is that special interests that engage in waste
disposal are just as likely-or perhaps even more likely, if they are well organizedto influence the agency as are those who suffer damages. The capture of regulatory
policies by polluters is not surprising when we realize that the costs of control are
concentrated on the polluter but the benefits are diffused across the population.
ANDERSON & LEAL, supranote 3, at 139-40.
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adjusting mechanisms built into regulations to evolve in response to
such changes, but the common law is inherently self-correcting.
The history of environmental regulation reveals numerous
instances where legislatures have preempted the common law.29
Although federalism and jurisdictional competition provide some
constraint on state governments over time by making transparent the
costs of such legislation, politicians are notoriously myopic. And, of

course, state governments are in the rent-seeking business. Professor
Frank Cross noted the rent-seeking tendencies in the context of the
relationship between state laws and common law actions:
The best illustration of the public choice shortcomings of
state regulation is the preemption issue. The nearly universal

presence of saving clauses in federal environmental
legislation is testimony to the fact that they are not the
products of special interest bargains. If special interests
provoked passage of federal environmental statutes in order

to escape the strict common law, the first characteristic that
one would expect to find in the statute is an explicit common
law preemption provision. Yet such provisions are absent in
federal law. . . . State legislation may not only lack the
savings clauses characteristics of federal legislation, but may

even expressly preempt state common law protections.30
Federalism relegates such rent-seeking concerns to a lower level of

policy concerns for a straightforward reason. At the state level,
citizens have to live in the stench of the stockyards and can move.

The question of whether interest-group restrictions on the common
law are in the public interest is not as important at the state level as at
the federal level because jurisdictional competition constrains states.

And, as discussed above, increased public concern about the

29 See Roger E. Meiners, et al., Burning Rivers, Common Law and InstitutionalChoicefor
Water Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supranote 3, at 54, 71.
30 Cross, Common Law Conceits, supra note 4 at 980. Cross argues for federal regulation,
on the basis that state legislatures were often influenced by special interests to discriminate
against out-of-state businesses through legislation that raised costs and barriers to entry. Federal
preemption of state laws was in turn the product of special interest lobbying to overcome the
challenges businesses faced with jurisdictional variety in environmental laws and regulations.
Id. at 976 ("While regulated interests played a role in the passage of the early environmental
legislation, they did not do so in order to preempt common law. The more plausible special
interest explanation for this legislation is that of Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian. They argue that
industry pushed the laws to supplant state legislative action, which was discriminating against
out-of-state business and creating fifty inconsistent rules that made compliance more difficult
and expensive. This would explain how even a stricter federal requirement, if uniform, would
reduce compliance costs by enabling economies of scale.") (citations omitted).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3

environment since the early 1970s has generally enhanced the ability
of jurisdictional competition to constrain state decisionmakers.
The relative slowness of the evolutionary common law process
also means that the common law does not quickly respond to crises
and environmental disasters. Such "fiddling while rivers burn" is
often politically unacceptable. It is perhaps too much to ask of
politicians to say, in effect, "don't worry, the courts will take care of
it in due time." Unfortunately, statutory remedies---often passed in
response to some crisis-often end up frozen in time and lagging
behind changes in technology and preferences.31
4. Balancing of Costs and Benefits
Richard Posner's famous assertion that the common law tended to
be efficient triggered a tremendous amount of research (and debate)
on legal processes and substantive legal rules.3 2 Efficiency of the
common law process means that the common law rules tend to reflect
a balancing of benefits and costs of parties engaging in an activity.
The classic example of such balancing is the negligence standard
articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Carroll Towing. Under the
famous Hand Formula, a defendant will be held negligent if the
burden of precaution is less than the expected harm avoided. In this
sense, the common law guides behavior by providing incentives to
engage in productive activity as long as the expected benefit is greater
than the expected cost. Activities that are expected to generate more
costs than benefits are deterred by the threat of liability.
As mentioned above, a large part of the common law approach to
environmental law is embodied in nuisance law. The liability standard
for nuisance law-a defendant will be held liable when he has
unreasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment of someone's
land-reflects a balancing of costs and benefits.33
31 In the absence of some type of built-in corrective mechanism, perhaps all statutory
revolutions should include sunset provisions.
32

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27-29 (5th ed. 1998). Under

Posner's models, the common law evolved toward efficiency without conscious economic
analysis or even without any such intent by judges. Efficient rules survive and inefficient ones
die. The legal processes research focused on what characteristics of the common law processes
yielded efficient legal rules. Numerous theories were developed, and most tended to include an
evolutionary process where inefficient decisions are more likely to be overturned than efficient
decisions because inefficient decisions result in greater litigation and thus greater opportunity to
be overturned. The research on substantive legal rules-where law and economics scholars
examined rules to determine if they were efficient in the sense that they provided incentives to
engage in productive activity-generally verified Posner's assertion about the efficiency of the
common law. For a thorough review and critique of the literature on the efficiency of the
common law, see Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law, supranote 16.
33See Hylton, supra note 14, at 525-26 ("The unreasonable interference test appears to
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The weighing of costs and benefits under the common law
nuisance standard should be compared to the absence of any weighing
of costs and benefits in the application of federal environmental
standards to specific situations. Common law adjudication is fact
intensive, whereas application of regulatory rules is only interested in
whether the rule was violated, not whether there was harm or whether
the harm
34 was somehow outweighed by the benefits from the
activity.

5. Reduced Rent-Seeking and Malfeasance
Judicial decisionmaking is generally much less susceptible to rentseeking, malfeasance and other distortions of a rational balancing of
costs and benefits. Legislators and regulators are agents of their
constituents. In addition to the usual agency concerns with laziness
and risk aversion, legislators and regulators are particularly
susceptible to making decisions that are not in their constituents' best
interests because of rent-seeking, rent-extraction, and good old
fashioned bribery.3 5 The legislative history of the Clean Air Act
vividly illustrates this problem, as special interests crafted legislation
that helped their narrow interest at the cost of not achieving the
putative goals of the legislation.36 Moreover, pressure from legislators
(motivated by interest group pressures) can lead to differential
enforcement of regulations by administrative agencies.

balance externalized benefits and externalized costs of the nuisance-generating activity. Where
there is reciprocal exchange, because the externalized benefits equal or exceed the externalized
costs, courts do not find interference unreasonable. Courts find unreasonable interference only
when reciprocity is violated because the externalized costs far exceed the externalized benefits.
Nuisance doctrine looks into the utility to the locale of the underlying activity in comparison to
its costs, the capacity of the plaintiff to bear the loss, whether the defendant's activity is
common to the locale, the priority in time among competing activities, and the nature of the
rights invaded."). See also Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U.
L. REv. 997 (1996).
34 Hylton, supra note 14, at 534 ("Like negligence law, nuisance law is a sophisticated,
information-rich regulatory scheme that has evolved over many years of trial and error. By
balancing external costs and external benefits, it has protected rights to develop and to enjoy
property, without presenting serious obstacles to economic growth. Environmental law has
taken a different track, relying on statutes and minimizing the common law's input. Nuisance
law has advantages over the statutory framework in terms of its treatment of local information
and enforcement incentives. [E]nvironmental law enforcement could be improved by returning
to some of the principles embodied in nuisance law.").
35 See, e.g., id. at 523-24.
36 As Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler demonstrate, environmentalists allied
themselves with eastern dirty coal producers and miners to impose regulations that were both
economically and environmentally inferior to obvious alternatives. BRUCE ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 117-18 (1981).
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In general, common law judges are not subjected to the same
pressures as legislators and regulators. The common law system runs
on its own with "minimal interference from politicians, lawyers,
industry special interests, or environmentalists. 37 Of course, almost
all judges are products of some political process, and thus bring some
political baggage and some ideological beliefs to the bench.
Moreover, in states where judges are elected, out-of-state defendants
do not fare as well.3 8 This analysis is ultimately a comparison of
alternative imperfect institutions where it seems likely that legislators
are more susceptible than judges to rent-seeking.39
6. PrioritySetting
The incentives to bring common law nuisance actions is driven by
the injured parties' (and their attorneys') calculations of the expected
costs and benefits of pursuing the actions. Actions involving trivial
damages will not be brought, in general. On the other hand, private
actions under federal and state environmental actions allow parties to
file actions and recover attorneys' fees for technical violations that
cause little if any harm. The common law redresses actual, provable
harms.
The ease of private actions under federal environmental statutes
and regulations can result in distorted enforcement. 40 Statutesespecially when crafted with citizen suit clauses and provisions for
37 Zywicki, EnvironmentalExternalities,supra note 1, at 913.
38 ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: AMERICAN TORT LAW

ON TRIAL 67-93 (2006).

39Interestingly, Frank Cross speculates as to the influences of special interests on judges,
particularly at the state level, as well as the ability of special interests to strategically settle cases
in order to avoid creation of unfavorable precedent. Cross, Common Law Conceits, supra note
4, at 972-3 (1999). However, in his later empirical study, he finds that the independence of the
judiciary in common law countries tends to prevent corruption in the legal system (compared
with civil law systems). Cross, Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law, supra note 14, at 29
("[C]ommon law's identifiable positive effect on judicial operations comes primarily through its
association with greater judicial independence. The results demonstrate that the apparent virtues
of English origin are attributable not to the conventionally recognized features of the common
law, such as its reliance on precedent, but to the derivative effect of the common law on judicial
power. A more powerful, independent judiciary has the ability to be less corrupt and more
predictable (as it need less defer to other institutions).").
4 YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3,

at 151-52 ("Some environmental public interest firms earn good revenues by filing citizen suits
for CWA violation. Even trivial violations can pay well. Even the most trivial environmental
problem will deserve regulatory attention. By contrast, common law procedures impose costs
and force litigants to ration their efforts. Rationing brings focus. For example, instead of
considering all hazardous waste sites to be equal, since they contain some amount of hazardous
waste, the sites will tend to be ranked on the basis of potential damage to people and the
environment. Those that pose the greatest risk will be addressed first. Those that pose trivial
threats will not be addressed at all.").
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lawyers' fees-skew the incentives for negotiation, suit, and
settlement. As Bruce Yandle explains:
Whether by common law or statute law, actions taken to
protect environmental assets and rights should be filtered on
some logical basis. The common law process asks for
scientific evidence of actual or potential harm. Access to
court is provided only to those who are actual parties to a
controversy-those who demonstrate that they or their
property have been damaged-and the remedies can provide
payment for damages and injunctions that stop the harmful
activity.
By comparison, statute law and regulation require
demonstration that rules have been violated; they do not
require evidence of damages. Any person can file a
complaint, whether damages can be shown or not. The
remedies that result provide no payment to those whose land
values have suffered or whose enjoyment of life has been
compromised. Instead the remedies give payment to those
who brought the action (the lawyer) and impose penalties on
those who violated the rules that may not be remotely related
to the value of the damage done. In short, the two approaches
contain different rationing systems and different reward
outcomes.4 '

Priority setting is extremely important in environmental policy for
the simple reason that the number of pollution discharge points is
unmanageably large. The centralized regulatory system, even with
great reliance on state enforcement, has been unable to effectively
monitor water pollution. However, the fact that many of these sites
are not generating private litigation suggests the possibility that the
discharge is not a major problem. It does not, however, demonstrate
that the regulators are engaged in a reasonable balancing of costs and
benefits where they do bring enforcement actions.

41 YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIORNMENT, supra note 3, at
151-52. See also Hylton, supra note 3, at 521-22 ("Moreover, the private litigation system has
the desirable property that overzealous (and potentially arbitrary) enforcement is unlikely to
occur. By overzealous enforcement, I refer to the case in which enforcement agents spend $1
million to stop a harm that costs $10,000. The risk regulation literature has already shown that
such cases exist.").
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7. Interactionof Common Law and Legislative Processes
This section has considered several advantages of the common law
process over the legislative process.42 Of course, these processes
overlap and influence each other. In the environmental area, the most
poignant episode of interaction of common law and legislative
processes is the enactment of federal environmental legislation after
the alleged failure of the state common law system to adequately
protect the environment. This episode, which is discussed in greater
detail below, warrants two observations that provide a fitting end to
our discussion of the common law and statutory processes. First, the
common law evolves very slowly and may lag behind rapid changes
in social norms such as the changes in environmental preferences that
occurred in the late 1960s. This vacuum creates opportunities for
entrepreneurial politicians to fill the gap. Second, legislative
intervention-through prohibition of common law actionsa--can
stifle the development of the common law and result in lower levels
of environmental protection that would have ultimately have been
provided by the common law.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF COMMON LAW ENVIRONMENTALISM

Common law environmentalism offers an alternative to the current
regime of centralized, bureaucratic regulation. Not surprisingly,
mainstream commentators are not exactly enamored with the idea of
ceding protection of the environment to the unordered world of
litigation. Others view the common law as a potential source for
strengthening the current regulatory regime. This Part responds to a
few of the attacks on common law environmentalism.

42 For a concise summary of alternative views of the relationship between statutes and the
common law, see Klass, supra note 6, at 547-54.
43 Professor Bruce Yandle, a leader in the development of common law
environmentalism, notes:

[A] large number of states by statute shield certain interest groups from nuisance and
other common-law actions. Protection of farmers from nuisance suits involving
odors and other potentially damaging environmental actions are most common. In a
1983 survey of these shield statutes, Margaret Grossman and Thomas Fischer found
that thirty-five states had enacted "right to farm" statutes that generally provided
some kind of protection from nuisance suits. Others states including Iowa, Kansas,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin have feedlot statutes that specifically shield the
livestock industry in those states. The protection of such operations by common law
is practically eliminated by such statutes.
YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at
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A. Common Law Environmentalism
Common law environmentalism has been described by Bruce
Yandle in pragmatic terms, based on its flexibility and evolutionary
characteristics:
[A] system of law that focuses on real environmental
problems when they are actually confronted by real people.
But while common-law logic may be coming to the fore, we
should recognize that its progress will be constrained, if not
accommodated, by statute law.... State law emerges from a
political struggle and tends to deal with expedienciesspecialized situations-in highly technical ways. By
constitutional rule, statutes dominate common law. By
contrast, common law emerges from a social process that
produces general rules that condition human behavior. Few
people know the details of statute law and the associated
regulation. Many people understand the common sense of
common law. 44
Yandle continues, explaining the rigidity of statutory law and the
concomitant constraint it places on mutually beneficial negotiations
between receptors and generators of pollution:
[S]tatute law embodies command-and-control regulation and
specifies a host of technical violations that can trigger law
enforcement actions. Any citizen can initiate an action,
provided appropriate evidence of a violation is presented.
There are no requirements for proof of damages or
demonstration of being a party to a controversy. Statute-based
penalties involve penalties imposed on law violators. There
are no provisions for damages to affected property owners.
Polluters and holders of environmental rights cannot engage
in transactions that transfer rights to a polluter. Citizens
cannot contract around the rule. All matters involving federal
statutes and regulation are resolved in the federal court
system. As the antithesis, the common-law remedies for
environmental problems are based on the law of torts. ...
Holders of common law rights can transfer the rights to
polluters. That is, individuals can contract around the rule. "5

4 YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW, supra note 3, at 162.

45 Id. at 162-63.
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The link between the free market environmentalism and common
law environmentalism involves more than the definition and
enforcement of property rights. Indeed, as discussed below, the
common law process encompasses market-like characteristics that
make common law environmentalism a logical extension of free
market environmentalism.
The common law approach to environmental regulation, in large
part embodied in nuisance law, reflects considerable sensitivity to
private local information.4 6 It makes facts matter and allows for
48
flexibility between them. 47 Blanket regulation cannot do so.
Common law rules are developed over time by interaction of
numerous self-interested litigants in an adversarial process. The
common law facilitates environmental markets, in contrast to
command-and-control regulation. Markets exhibit a form of economic
Darwinism in which economic actors who make successful decisions
garner control of more resources and those who make bad decisions
lose control of resources.49
Most proponents of greater reliance on common law protections
are not advocating complete dismantling of the current regulatory
regime. Rather they are simply advocating taking advantage of the
available tools. 50 Market failures might sometimes justify regulation,
but it should not be presumed that resorting to coercive regulation is
the optimal solution. 5' Policy analysts should not immediately jump
Hylton, supranote 14, at 524-25.
47 Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficienby in the Common Law:, supra
note 25, at 1002-03 ("[T]he relative institutional superiority of the common law to legislation
lies in the common law's ability to preserve individual expectations. Reliance on precedent
maintains the stability of the common law through time.").
48See Stewart, supra note 1, at 154 (arguing that long term pollution controls cannot be
dependent on command-and-control systems of governmental regulation).
49 Economic Darwinism-a variation on the biological theory of natural selection-has
been applied to numerous economic and legal contexts. In industrial organization economics,
Nobel Laureate George Stigler used Economic Darwinism to study economies of scale. George
J. Stigler, The Divisionof Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. OF POL. & ECON'Y.
185, 191-94 (1951). In the economic analysis of organizations, Eugene Fama and Michael
Jensen used Economic Darwinism for their discussion of organizational forms. Eugene F. Fama
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983)
("Absent fiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the
product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs.").
46

s0 YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at

89 ("The economic way of thinking suggests we should consider all the tools in our toolbox
when addressing a problem, matching specific tools to specific features of the problem. I believe
the common law offers a powerful set of incentives that encourage those who care most,
property owners, to seek low-cost remedies for a large array of environmental problems.").
51 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal
Environmental Regulation,90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 474 (2005) ("[T]there is growing
environmental literature suggesting that greater reliance on state tort law, or at least upon tort
law principles, would improve environmental protection.").
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to an assumption that governmental regulation is necessary or capable
of solving the harms that may be caused from such pollution.
B. The Irrelevance of Common Law Failure
The major federal environmental protection statutes were passed in
the early 1970s in response to growing public sentiment for greater
protection of the environment. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring is often
credited with launching the modem environmental movement, yet the
ultimate catalyst for passage of federal environmental legislation was
probably the infamous "burning river" incident when the Cuyahoga
River in Ohio caught on fire on June 22, 1969.52 Although there is
considerable controversy over the facts and the interpretation of the
facts, this episode is often viewed as strong evidence that the states
and the common law were not doing an adequate job of protecting the
environment. 3
Indeed, it has often been argued that the common law was
particularly ill-suited to deal with pollution:
The obstacles to legal action in the pre-statutory common law
system included: (1) significant standing requirements; (2)
tough evidentiary burdens on the plaintiff to prove that the
alleged polluter's conduct was unreasonable; (3) "overly
solicitous" defenses available to the alleged polluter; (4) the
burden on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's pollution
caused the plaintiffs injury; and (5) the real possibility that
even if the plaintiff proved injury and causation, a court
would refuse to enjoin the polluting activity because of a
balancing of the equities. The failings of the pre-statutory
common law system of environmental protection are also
explained by certain limitations in the judicial process: (1) the
fortuitous nature of court action that prevents it from serving
as a reliable pollution control program; (2) the ex post
character of litigation and the resultant inability of courts to
take preventive action in anticipation of future problems; (3)
52 See Cuyahoga River Area of Concern, available at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/aoc/
cuyahoga.html ("Fires plagued the Cuyahoga beginning in 1936 when a spark from a blow torch
ignited floating debris and oils. Fires erupted on the river several more times before June 22,
1969, when a river fire captured national attention when Time magazine described the
Cuyahoga as the river that "oozes rather than flows" and in which a person "does not drown but
decays." This event helped spur an avalanche of pollution control activities resulting in the
Clean Water Act, Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, and the creation of the federal and
state Environmental Protection Agencies.").
53 See, e.g., Meiners, et al., supra note 29; Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga:

Reconstructinga History of EnvironmentalProtection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2003).
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the traditional reluctance of courts to issue affirmative orders
requiring specific actions by polluters; and (4) the reality that
the adversarial process does not ensure representation of the
public's interest in pollution control. These limitations, when
combined with the degraded state of the environment and
courts' reluctance to enjoin polluting activity, demonstrate
why Congress enacted comprehensive environmental statutes
to remedy some of the failings in the pre-statutory common
law system of environmental protection.54
In this public interest view, national politicians seized on public
concerns about the environment and proceeded to pass several major
acts and created a massive federal bureaucracy.
The enduring legacy of the burning river is that the common law
failed to adequately protect the environment. Proponents of increased
reliance on the common law argue that the common law was, in fact,
doing a fairly good job of protecting the environment in the 1960s 5 5which was the beginning of a trend toward increased environmental
quality that would have occurred without federal intervention.56 The
public's demand for increased environmental quality was driven by
increasing wealth during the long economic expansion following
World War II. Regardless, for present purposes, it is not necessary to
resolve the historical debate about the role of the common law.
Suffice it to say that a less than perfect common law was replaced by
a less than perfect regulatory regime.
The assertion that pollution was at higher levels under the common
law simply means that parties who could have filed common law
actions to stop or reduce pollution either
(a) were not harmed enough to care;
(b) were compensated for not bringing the action;

5 Andrew M. Thompson, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law:
Confusion, Nostalgia,and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 1355 (1996).
55 For example, a review of the facts reveals that the common law was not the problem,

rather the massive pollution of the Cuyahoga occurred because state laws forbade common law
nuisance actions against the polluters. See Meiners, et al., supra note 29.
56 Paul Portney of Resources for the Future reasoned that "[t]he fact that at least some
measures of air quality were improving at an impressive rate before 1970 suggests that other
factors in addition to the Clean Air Act are behind recent improvements." Paul Portney, Air
Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 51 (Paul Portney ed.
1990).
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(c) could not file suit because of problems with civil
procedure; or
(d) could not file suit because state law preempted common
law actions.
Arguably, these "problems" with the common law have been solved
through changes in our legal system:
(a) The "not harmed enough" problem has been solved as
classes are routinely certified without class members knowing
of the harm.
(b) Historical evidence reveals numerous instances where
polluters contracted with local property owners to allow their
property to be harmed.
(c) In the post-statutory era, common law actions are much
easier to bring than earlier. Meiners and Yandle assert that the
common law of public nuisance has improved. 57 The law has
evolved, and the technology of lawsuits has made it easier to
bring actions.58 Moreover, plaintiffs' lawyers have perfected
mass tort and class action claims. They have no real resource
constraints.5 9
(d) Most states have saving clauses that maintains a role for
their common law.
57 Meiners & Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy,
supra note 3, at 928. ("Now that claims for public nuisance actions no longer require a 'different
injury' requirement or the 'criminal interference' requirement, the common law theory can more
easily address a wide range of environmental ills. Any person who is injured can sue for
equitable relief and monetary damages; courts will merely refer to the nuisance resulting in
money damages as a 'private nuisance' to the individual seeking money.").
58 YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3,
at 160. But how has the common law suddenly overcome the alleged handicaps that made it so
unworkable that statute law had to come to the rescue? After all, critics said that common law
was ineffective in dealing with environmental harms involving multiple culprits. Clear evidence
of harm is required by common-law rule. And what about the problem of many receivers of
harm, not all of whom are damaged sufficiently to have an incentive to bring an action?
Advances in science address the first problem. Computer modeling and the development
of schemes for matching waste with its source make it feasible to identify pollution sources.
And greater expectations that public prosecutors will pursue public nuisance cases bring a more
effective response from attorneys general when a few citizens complain.
59 For documentation of the organized plaintiffs' bar, see http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/clp.htm#tli.
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Debate over the common law of the 1960s should be largely
irrelevant to the current policy debate over whether to scale back the
federal environmental regulatory structure in favor of a return to state
authority and common law adjudication. Political, economic and
legal changes have fundamentally reshaped the environment in which
the common law is applied. One of the benefits of the common law is
that it tends, over time, to reflect and enforce the norms of a society. 60
But, because the common law evolves slowly, it sometimes lags
behind more rapid changes in public preferences. Arguably, this
timing problem is what allowed national politicians to exploit the
perceived need for federal intervention in the early 1970s. Even if it is
true that the common law could not keep up with rapid changes in
public preferences in the 1960s, it does not follow that the common
law could not have caught up over time. The counterfactual question
of what the common law would look like today if the federal statutes
had not been passed is an important component of comparative
institutional analysis. It seems reasonable to presume that the lasting
change in popular sentiment for greater protection of the environment
that began in the 1960s would have eventually worked its way into
enhanced common law protections for the environment. Although it is
impossible to know with precision what the common law would look
like today, one can only speculate that it would include an increased
reliance on property rules to deter pollution, and perhaps routine
awards of punitive damages when property rules are ignored.
Regardless of the precise rules that could have evolved, it should be
clear that the common law of the 1960s-and the accompanying
disputed evidence-are largely irrelevant to current policy debates.
C. The Economic Meaning of Doing a "BetterJob" in Environmental
Protection
The debate about the choice of environmental policy instrumentcommon law or statutory law-has inadvertently been cast as a
question of which instrument is more likely to achieve greater
environmental quality. Dogged pursuit of increased environmental
quality-cleaner air, cleaner water, cleaner dirt-is generally not the
goal of rational environmental policy. Rational environmental policy
seeks a balancing of benefits and costs in determining the optimal
level of environmental quality. In this framework, there can be "too
much" environmental quality. Thus, even if greater reliance on the
common law could result in less environmental quality in some
60 See generally HOLMES, supra note 7.
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localities or states, it could nonetheless result in better-thatis, closer
to optimal--environmental quality. The counterintuitive notionwhich surely strikes many environmentalists as wrongheaded-is that
a better environmental policy could involve more (not less) pollution.
When the leading proponents of common law environmentalismboth of whom are economists-asserted that the common law would
do a "better job",61 than federal environmental regulation, they were
implicitly assuming that the common law would provide a better
process for trading off costs and benefits to find the optimal level of
pollution. Unfortunately, critics of common law environmentalism
have missed this fundamental economic point.
Meiners and Yandle's strong statement about the common law
doing a "better job" may have had the unintended consequence of
diverting attention from the important potentially beneficial effects of
increased reliance on the common law.62 It probably would have been

a political mistake for Meiners and Yandle to argue that greater
reliance on the common law could result in more pollution-which in
some instances would be a better reflection of societal norms and
values. The analysis in this Article suggests that perhaps a better way
for Meiners and Yandle to state their position would have been that
the common law could do a better job of discovering the optimal
amount of pollution-in some areas, it might mean more pollution
and in other areas it might mean less pollution. In this regard, the
common law process is superior to a rigid, outdated federal
environmental regulatory standard.
D. State Common Law Was Not Preemptedand It Plays An Important
Role in the CurrentRegulatory Regime
A great deal of Meiners and Yandle's argument that the common
law would do a "better job" protecting the environment than the
federal environmental statutes appears to be based on their implicit
assumption that state common law is preempted by the national
environmental laws. This implicit assumption appears inconsistent
with Bruce Yandle's earlier discussion of a resurgence of the
common law.63 Nonetheless, Professor Frank Cross used this opening
61 Meiners & Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy,
supra note 3, at 925. ("The common law, combined with various state-level controls, was doing
a better job addressing most environmental problems than the federal monopoly, which directed
most environmental policy for the last part of this century.").
62 Indeed, Frank Cross states that "claims that the common law will provide stricter or
better environmental protection are merely an unnecessary distraction." Cross, Common Law
Conceits, supra note 4, at 10.
63 YANDLE, supra note 4.
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to pounce on Meiners and Yandle. Cross clearly demonstrated that
state common law was not preempted by the federal environmental
statutes.64
The fact that state common law was not preempted, however, does
not in anyway demonstrate that common law environmental
protections would be inadequate in the absence of federal regulation.
All that Cross has demonstrated is that Meiners and Yandle appear to
have made a mistake in implying that the common law was
preempted. Cross's evidence of the continuing use of the common
law after the passage of the federal legislation suggests that the
common law is indeed-at least in some circumstances-providing
greater environmental protections than the federal legislation.
Far from being preempted by the federal environmental statutes,
the common law fulfills significant roles in the current regulatory
regime. Perhaps the most important role is to reinforce the federal
statutes and regulations through common law actions for
compensation.65 Some commentators who are unhappy with the
performance of the current regulatory regime argue that common law
actions should be used to supplement and improve-not replace-the
current system. These commentators are dissatisfied with the federal
laws because they do not provide enough protection for the
environment.6 6 They would like to see the common law used to
provide superior environmental protection in terms of further
reductions of pollution.67 For example, the common law fills
numerous gaps in the federal regulatory scheme. 68 As Czarnezki and
Thomsen explain:

6 Cross, supra note 4, at 969 ("Virtually every major piece of federal environmental
legislation contains a savings clause stating that the statute would 'restrict' any right that any
person (or claims of persons) may have under any statute or common law."). He further
demonstrates that common law nuisance claims have dramatically increasedsince the passage
of federal environmental legislation. Id. at 970 table 1. He argues that "the common law is still
with us and even thriving[.]" ld. at 966.
65 Indeed, one of Meiners and Yandle's primary concerns was that the federal preemption
had reduced the financial responsibility of polluters. Meiners & Yandle, Common Law and
Conceit of Modern EnvironmentalPolicy,supra note 3.
6 Czamezki & Thomsen, supra note 7 ("Stated simply, the common law strives for
immediate cleanup of pollution and condemns the destruction of the natural environment.").
67 Another commentator, Alexandra Klass, advocates "strengthening the common law as a
means of environmental protection.... [l]t is both allowable and desirable to develop a new
state common law that incorporates data, standards and policy principles obtained in the
statutory era to provide increased protection for human health and the environment." Aleandra
B. Klass, Common Law and Federalismin the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 2
(forthcoming 2008).
68 See, e.g., Klass, supra note 6, at 21 ("state common law can be revived to fill its historic
role as a 'gap-filler' to address environmental protection needs based in part on the policies and
data generated by environmental statutes and regulations.").
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Statutory
omissions,
administrative
problems
and
enforcement inefficiencies should not limit common law
causes of action that might provide additional remedies to
landowners. In light of the inadequacies of the federal regime,
common law principles have a role to play. The common law,
first, should not be adversely affected by the federal role
(e.g., CERCLA compliance orders administered by the EPA),
and, second, should force polluters to be seen as violators of
state law that serves as a deterrent of environmental
pollution.6 9
This gap-filling role of the common law implicitly concedes that the
common law can provide greater environmental protection that, at
least to some commentators, is superior.
Finally, the common law has been viewed as a safety net that
provides a backup protection of the environment when a change in
administration and the influence of interest groups results in less
administrative enforcement of federal regulations.7 °
E. The One-Way Ratchet: The Mirage of Common-Law Vitality in the
Post-StatutoryEra

Professor Cross presents evidence of the increased number of
reported environmental nuisance actions after the passage of the
federal environmental statutes. Cross believes that this evidence
supports the conclusion that the common law was, in fact,
"reinvigorated" by the passage of federal environmental statutes:
There is reason to believe that it is statutory law itself that
reinvigorated the use of the common law for environmental
protection. The combination of citizen suits authorized by
statutes and traditional, common law actions is synergistic.
The statutory citizens suit enables plaintiffs to get into federal
court, which is generally a more favorable forum for their
claims. The ability to combine statutory and common law
claims also may better enable plaintiffs to recover their
attorneys' fees upon victory and facilitate their ability to
obtain equitable relief. Rather than inhibiting common law,
environmental statutes may empower the traditional
remedies. This claim is consistent with the finding that the
Czamezki & Thomsen, supra note 7.
10 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulation and Litigation: Contemporary Tools for
EnvironmentalProtection, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 371 (2005).
69
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common law has been more frequently employed in recent
years. Hence, the claim that abandoning statutes for the
common law would offer better environmental protection
is
7
difficult to sustain-the common law is still with us. '
The common law plays an important role in improving the
functioning of the current centralized regulatory system; however, it
does not necessary follow that the common law was "reinvigorated"
in the sense of enhanced realization of the traditional benefits of the
common law. It is one thing to state "the common law is still with
us"; it is quite another thing to assert that our current system is taking
full advantage of the benefits of the common law process.72 In this
regard, Cross does not adequately address the impact of the federal
statutes on the evolution of the common law.
Perhaps the most telling part of Cross's critique of Meiners and
Yandle is his implicit assumption that current federal regulatory law
is superior to the common law. This bias is revealed in his analysis of
the evidentiary value of regulatory compliance with federal
regulations in state common law actions:
While regulatory compliance is not an effective defense to
common law liability, regulatory noncompliance is a
powerful tool for common law plaintiffs. Meiners and Yandle
overlook this key point. A violation of environmental
regulations is commonly regarded as proof of negligence or
nuisance per se, thus easing considerably a plaintiffs burden
of proof in a tort action. Therefore, rather than weakening the
common law, statutory requirements may actually strengthen
its application. Any vitality the common law ever had is still
present.73
If the statutory requirements are "too strict" and thus would not
result in liability under traditional common law nuisance standards,
Cross would nonetheless conclude that the statutory requirements had
"strengthened" the application of the common law and confirmed its
"vitality."
71 Cross, Common Law Conceits, supra note 4, at 970.
72 For the view that the common law has suffered as a result of federal legislation and that
it is receiving less attention in court than it would in the absence of federal law, see H. Marlow
Green, Can the Common Law Survive in the Modern Statutory Environment?, 8 CORNELL J. L.
AND PUB. POL'Y 89 (1998).
73 Cross, Common Law Conceit, supra note 4, at 969. For a suggestion that regulatory
compliance can be helpful to the defense, see YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW,
supra note 3, at 154 ("While being in compliance was not necessarily a shield, the permit and
good data on discharge was often persuasive and hard to defeat.").
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An alternative and superior view is that the common law
strengthened and reinforced the statutory requirements, regardless of
whether the statutory requirements reflected sound policy. Making
bad policy stronger is not a logical reason for championing the
common law. Moreover, the federal statutes limited the range of
potential evolution of the common law.
Cross's effort to discredit Meiners and Yandle results in his
support of a kind of one-way ratchet effect where the common law
can only increase standards; common law standards below statutory
standards are irrelevant. This exogenous constraint on the
evolutionary process of the common law threatens the "vitality" of
the common law. If the statutes are rigid and unchanging, as Cross
has argued in other environmental regulation contexts, 74 the common
law cannot evolve. Thus, the vitality of the common law must be
compromised to some extent by federal statutes. In the words of
Professor Alexandra Klass, "something has been lost."75
In addition to hampering the evolution of the common law by
limiting the range of relevant decisions, federal statutory domination
of environmental law short-circuits the benefits of competitive
federalism in both statutory law and the common law. As discussed
above and elsewhere, federalism can be structured to improve
environmental regulation. Similarly, federalism can provide an
improved institutional structure for the dynamic evolution of the
common law as state courts follow and reject rulings from other
states. Unlike monopolistic federal legislation, federalism and the
common law provide an institutional framework for reversing policy
mistakes.
F. EmpiricalEvidence on the Role of the Common Law in the PostStatutory Era
To support his critique of Meiners and Yandle's strong claim that
the common law would have provided better environmental
protection, Frank Cross collected data documenting an increase in the
number of state common law claims filed after passage of the federal
74 See Frank B. Cross, The Consequences of Compromise, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1155 (1997)
(criticizing the Food Quality Protection Act as too restrictive in pesticide regulation); Frank B.
Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 851, 87986 (1996) (arguing that strict environmental regulation causes more health harm than it cures);
Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/HealthAnalysis, 22
ECOL. L.Q. 729, 732-33 (1995) (contending that high cost of compliance with environmental
regulations produces additional morbidity and mortality); Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in
Risk Control, 24 ENV. LAW 887, 941-43 (1994) (claiming that tendencies to overregulate in
response to environmental problems are counterproductive).
75Klass, supranote 68.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3

environmental statutes. Cross's empirical evidence has some serious
flaws.
First, he equates the filing of nuisance actions with better
environmental protection. In a well-functioning civil justice system,
well-developed nuisance rules can result in fewer lawsuits and less
pollution. Cross does produce some evidence of a correlation between
increased nuisance actions and increased environmental quality. But it
is difficult to cull out not only the contemporaneous effects of new
federal statutes and regulations, but also the relationship with overall
trends toward improved environmental quality.76
Second, the upward trend in filing of nuisance lawsuits is also
consistent with an interpretation that supports the role of the common
law in protecting the environment. Social norms toward pollution
changed dramatically during the 1960's. To the extent the common
law evolves to reflect social norms, subtle changes in the law (or in
juries' willingness to hold polluters liable-a reflection of changed
norms) may have made nuisance actions more attractive, even
holding the amount of pollution constant. Cross does nothing to
control for this. Also, Cross does not account for the fact that more
common law suits will necessarily result from federal regulation that
includes savings clauses. Plaintiffs would have the incentive to bring
a common law claim in tandem with a federal claim, especially when
violation of the latter is easier to prove and may be regarded as per se
liability for the former. Plaintiffs will thus be able to "double their
money," but this has no bearing on whether either claim is effective at
bringing about optimal levels of pollution. Rather, the incidence of
common law claims would simply track the preexisting policy
decisions made by federal legislators. Cross might do better in
proving that the common law is "thriving" under the present regime
by analyzing how common law claims were brought independently of
federal actions, and also which joint claims yielded liability under
common law nuisance but not under the federal regulation.
It is impossible to know how many common law nuisance actions
would have been filed if the federal statutes had not become law.
Cross's evidence does not rule out the possibility that even more
common law actions would have been filed but for the federal
statutes-that is, there could have been a type of crowding out of state
common law actions. Regulatory suits are far easier to bring than
common law suits, so it is at least conceivable that there was some
substitution of regulatory suits. 77 Regardless, Cross has not supported
76

See supranote 56.
COMMON SENSE

77 YANDLE,

AND COMMON LAW,

supra note 3 at 156 ("The relative
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his conclusion that "[t]he combination of citizen suits authorized by
statutes and traditional, private common law actions is synergistic. ' 8
The truly surprising thing about Cross's empirical evidence is that
common law environmental actions appear to have not soared to the
same degree as other areas of litigation. Yes, environmental actions
have been a large part of the litigation explosion, but they have not
been at the level of actions one would expect in view of the
protestations of many environmental groups about the dire state of the
environment. If people were suffering large harms from the nastiness
of environmental harm, we should expect to observe far more tort
litigation. One explanation for this admittedly casual observation is
that more suits are not being filed because the environment is
reasonably clean.
III. A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK FOR EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY

This Part develops an institutional framework for promoting
experimentation and evolution in environmental policy. It begins with
a simple model of jurisdictional choice in which jurisdictions are free
to select the common law as the primary instrument for
environmental protection. It ends with a pair of simple default rules
for promoting experimentation, evolution, and reversibility of policy
mistakes. Common law environmentalism and jurisdictional
competition provide a dynamic process through which policy options
are discovered and discarded in response to the reality of perpetual
changes in technology and political preferences.
A. Simple EvolutionaryModel
Two neighboring states in a federal system differ in many ways
important to their relative desires for a cleaner environment. Their
citizens have different income levels, education levels, and pollution
tolerances. Moreover, one state is densely populated and the other
sparely populated. The citizens of one state have different attitudes
toward pollution than the citizens of the other. There are sources of

simplicity of statute-based action helps to explain why statute-law actions tend to drive out

common-law actions. But in driving out common law, it is possible that the realism of the
common law is lost. Under statute law, the anchors of property rights are no longer secure.
Proof of harm is not necessary. Risk is not a necessary consideration. Statutory violation is. It is
possible that low-risk polluters will be pursued at great cost, while higher risk polluters are
overlooked.").
18 Cross, Common Law Conceit, supranote 4, at 970.
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localized pollution in both states. There is zero trans-boundary
pollution, and citizens and/or their assets can move between
jurisdictions at low cost.
One possible response to the local pollution is centralized
command-and-control regulation over
both states. Given the
differences between the states, it is impossible for a centralized
command-and-control system of environmental protection to be
optimal for citizens of both states at the same time. Although it is
possible to be optimal for the citizens of one state, it is likely that that
happy coincidence will not occur and consequently citizens of both
states will live in sub-optimal regulatory environments.
For purposes of analysis, assume the central government totally
abandons the field of environmental regulation, but each state
imposes its own command-and-control regulatory structure. States
would be able to compete in ways that had previously been
unavailable. Initially, jurisdictional competition between state statutebased regulations might lead to experimentation as states attempt to
tailor their regulations to their citizens' preferences. 79 These benefits
of jurisdictional competition have been discussed for years.80 Within
this framework, states and their political actors would be forced to
engage in balancing of costs and benefits to the betterment of their
citizens.
An additional step away from the original centralized regulatory
regime would be for a state to exit the regulatory field altogether,
leaving the protection of environmental assets entirely to private
litigants and the common law courts. Many environmentalists would
expect the common law state to quickly become an environmental
wasteland with toxic sites, burning rivers and polluted skies; in stark
contrast to the superior environment provided in the regulated state.
However, our simple model of jurisdictional competition suggests
that such a doomsday scenario for the deregulated state is highly
unlikely.
Assume State A decides to repeal all statutory regulations, while
State B maintains a statutory regulatory framework. It is plausible that
the common law of State A will maintain environmental quality in
State A because:
79 See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996).

80 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 592
(1996) (tailoring policies to local needs and desires reduces abilities to protect property rights
and to limit transjurisdictional pollution to an efficient level); see also Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for
FederalEnvironmental Regulation,67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
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* Public awareness and perceptions of the value of
environmental assets;
* Should State A's environmental quality fall below State
B's, it would be obvious to citizens of State A;
* Media willingness
wrongdoing;

to

expose

and

sensationalize

* Mobility of citizens, consumers, and capital;
* Environmental groups solve some free rider problems;
" Sophisticated and aggressive plaintiffs bar;
* If environmental assets are highly valued by citizens of
State A, juries would likely reflect these values.
In this decentralized world, where only property rights and the
common law protect environmental assets, it would be highly
unlikely for environmental quality to spiral downward.
If State A does not suffer significant environmental degradation
under the common law, then State B might wonder why it should
bother with providing a regulatory structure to protect its
environment. State B might recognize that it receives little, if any
benefit at substantial cost, and decide to repeal its regulatory structure
in favor of common law environmental protections.
This simple model establishes a simple point-dismantling the
current regulatory regime, at least in terms of dealing with local
pollution, is not likely to result in environmental catastrophe.
Different institutional arrangements are likely to yield different
environmental outcomes; and different environmental outcomes may
better match the environmental preferences of communities with
different preferences. This is not Nirvana; it is not perfect. Policy
mistakes may occur. Indeed, as in evolutionary biology, a policy
mistake (that is, a mutation) may lead to the discovery of superior
means of environmental protection. Increased reliance on the
common law could be a major improvement over the current
regulatory regime.
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B. Federalismand the Presumptionof Decentralization
Much of the condemnation of the common law as a means for
protecting the environment is based on a lack of confidence in the
ability of states to develop adequate legal rules in the face of interest
group pressure to compete in a "race to the bottom." Although state
regulations are a major force in environmental regulation, 1 the
perceived state government failure has provided the basis for many
calls for continued federal domination of environmental policy.
In recent years, there has been a growing appreciation of the
potential to use federalism and jurisdictional competition as tools in
improving environmental regulation.82 Professor Richard Revesz has
argued that most pollution is local, and thus there should be a
presumption of decentralized regulation.83 Similarly, Professors
Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey have argued that jurisdictional
competition is likely to generate optimal laws if four conditions are
fulfilled:
(1) the economic entities affected by the law must be able to
move to alternative jurisdictions at a relatively low cost; (2)
all of the consequences of one jurisdiction's laws must be felt
within that jurisdiction; (3) lawmakers must be forced to
respond to adverse events such as falling population, real
estate prices, market share or revenue, and other
manifestations of voter discontent that result from inefficient
regulations; and (4) jurisdictions must be able to select any
set of laws they desire.84
Analyzing a particular pollution control problem using these
conditions can clarify the optimal level of government to address the
problem.85
Butler and Macey developed a matching principle that suggests
that optimal regulation should match the size of the externality. If an

81See, e.g., Klass, supra note 6, at 569 ("While it is generally recognized that state
regulatory efforts continue to play a major role in environmental protection (where state
agencies can develop expertise), the same recognition often does not extend to state common
law-beyond, perhaps, the ability to collect damages where federal law does not provide for
such a remedy.").
82 See ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM (Terry L. Anderson and P.J. Hill, eds. 1997);
BUTLER AND MACEY, supranote 80; Revesz, supra note 81; Adler, supra note 51.
83 Revesz, , supranote 81.
84 Butler & Macey, Pollution, Externalitiesand The Matching Principle,supra note 9.
85 Butler and Macey critique the major rationales for national level regulation: limiting
interstate externalities; halting a "race to the bottom;" controlling political cost externalization;
capturing national economies of scale in administration, technical expertise, and funding; and
maintaining national moral ideals.
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externality is local, the regulatory response should be local. If an
externality is statewide, then the regulatory response should be
statewide. If an externality imposes significant costs across state lines,
then a multi-state response-with possible national coordination is
appropriate. As with Revesz, Butler and Macey conclude that
regulatory responses should begin with a presumption of
decentralization.
More recently, Professor Todd Zywicki has provided a political
externalities argument in favor of the presumption of decentralization.
Pollution externalities are the result of private decision makers not
bearing the full costs of their decisions.86 Statutes and regulations
ostensibly intended to correct pollution externalities often result in
political externalities as public policy makers bear little of the costs
imposed by the regulations. Political externalities can result from
interest group bargains designed to help one group at the expense of
another. As Todd Zywicki has stated:
[L]egal scholars must stop railing about environmental
externalities without also considering the political
externalities inherent in the regulatory process. Buchanan and
Tullock noted thirty years ago that majoritarian democracy
creates political externalities the same way as polluters create
pollution externalities. In both cases, those favoring a
particular use for property are entitled to87 use it without
having to pay the full opportunity cost for it.
As Zywicki continues, he notes that federal regulation of localized
problems is simply inefficient:
Once it is realized that political externalities are at least as
prevalent
as environmental
externalities, numerous
implications arise. For instance, the idea that most
environmental regulation should emanate from the national
level simply vaporizes. Most pollution is local in its source
and impact; thus, most environmental externalities are also
best dealt with by local action. Elevating the locus of
regulation to the federal level does little to deal with these
environmental externalities, except for the rare circumstances
of large interstate or international forms of pollution. But
federal action creates massive political externalities. In
particular, national regulation creates the opportunity for
96
87

Zywicki, PoliticalExternalities, supra note 1.

Id. at 912.
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some regions to use regulation as a method to transfer wealth
to themselves at the expense of other regions. By
disintegrating the protections created by federalism, national
regulation also eliminates many of federalism's constraints on
the ability of special interests to seek rents and the ability of
politicians to extract them. Thus, as Professor Revesz has
suggested, there should be a presumption of decentralization
in regulation, but not necessarily for the reasons he
articulated.88
A presumption in favor of decentralized responses to externalities is
an important first step in revitalizing common law environmentalism.
Of course, as suggested above, one concern with decentralization
is that state governments are particularly susceptible to interest group
legislation in environmental regulation.8 9 It is undeniable that the
federal government as well as state governments are in the rentseeking business. The key challenge is to develop institutional
structures that channel interest group pressures in a manner that
increases the quality of laws and regulations. Competitive federalism
in environmental regulation provides such an institutional structure.
C. Conceit v. Conceit: Closed versus Open Systems in the Evolution
of the Common Law
Professor Frank Cross has criticized Meiners and Yandle for
naively believing that a perfect common law process would replace a
federal regulatory structure dominated by special interests. Cross calls
this the "Common Law Conceit":
Even if one accepts the claims that public law displaced
common law, there remains the crucial problem with the
authors' position in their unrealistic contrast of a tawdry
public-choice infected legislature and executive with an
and
judiciary
neutrally
idealized,
Rhadamanthine
scrupulously applying a transparent common law. It is as if
judges were Olympian gods handing down principled legal
decision, which Meiners and Yandle would contrast with
biased political decisions rendered by the accountable
branches of government. But the judiciary is a political
system just as is the legislature. While the political system of
litigation differs from the political system of legislation, those
98Id. at 912-13.
89 See Cross, Common Law Conceit,supra note 4, at 980.

2008]

DEFENSE OF COMMON LA WENVIRONMENTALISM

743

differences may make90 the courts more vulnerable to special
interest manipulation.
In effect, Cross is accusing Meiners and Yandle of committing what
economists often call the "Nirvana Fallacy"-the tendency for policy
entrepreneurs to criticize imperfect markets and assume that their
solutions are perfect. 9' Yes, Meiners and Yandle are very critical of
the current federal regulatory regime-as are the vast majority of
legal commentators, including Cross.92 But, Meiners and Yandle are
well aware that the common law process is not perfect. Comparative
institutional analysis does not reject one option because it is
imperfect, but instead asks which option is superior.
Obviously, Professor Cross is much more skeptical of the
common law process than are Meiners and Yandle. Professor Cross
claims that "the litigation process itself favors the moneyed and
disadvantages the general public. 93 By this, Cross clearly means that
big companies (polluters) benefit at the expense of the environment
and the general public. This seems inconsistent with his earlier
documentation of how effective the common law had been in
bringing polluters to justice. Ironically, Cross's statement makes

1,1.

90Id. at 970-71.
91See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON.

92Cross, along with Meiners and Yandle, agrees that federal environmental regulation has
gone too far. Cross, Common Law Conceits, supra note 4, at 981-82 ("Far better, I think, is a
frank position that environmental regulation has gone too far and should be pruned back. I
believe that we can get closest to the optimal environmental policy by retaining but rewriting
federal laws and regulations to require consideration of costs and benefits, scientifically accurate
risk estimates, and other factors before regulating."). The great divide between Cross and
Meiners-Yandle is that Cross appears to believe that the federal regulatory system can be fixed
if enough smart people are brought to bear on the problem while Meiners-Yandle believe that a
fundamental change in the institutions of environmental policy is necessary to find the solution.
As explained by Meiners and Yandle:
Those plagued with the fatal conceit believe that national governments are always
better equipped to gather more and better information than the unfettered forces of
markets constrained by rules of law. Yet, even if central authorities solve the
information problem, statute writing is a batch process where information is
assembled periodically and durable statutes are written and implemented. As the
world evolves and changes, the information underpinnings of statutes still in force
become obsolete. On the other hand, the common law process is continuous; it draws
together information on controversies as they occur; and evolves as the world
changes. While errors may be made in either case, in statute writing the cost of error
is logically higher, because statutes are all-encompassing and more costly to change.
Meiners & Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy,supra
note 3, at 959. Cross responds that, "Meiners and Yandle, who are so cynical about the public
choice reasons for federal environmental legislation, should be more cynical about reliance on
state legislation." Cross, Common Law Conceits, supranote 4, at 980.
93Cross, Common Law Conceits, supra note 4, at 972.
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sense if some of the moneyed are sophisticated plaintiffs' attorneys
who stand to gain enormous sums for successfully suing large
corporations who will then pass on the increased costs in the form of
higher prices.
Cross cites three factors in support of his argument that the
litigation process favors polluters. First, there are the general
litigation maneuvers that corporations, with expensive counsel, have
greater ability to manipulate in their favor. This claim is surely offset
by the role of the sophisticated plaintiffs' bar and its proven track
record against large corporations.94 Second, he also argues that state
judges, because they must seek re-election, are equally susceptible to
being influenced by moneyed corporations via campaign
contributions. However, his own 2005 article-where he found
judicial independence to be one of the resounding virtues of the
common law system-appears to rebut this argument. Judges cannot
be completely independent of politics and increase group pressures,
but-on any continuum from pure independence to rent-extracting
entrepreneurs-the typical judge would appear to be relatively more
independent than the typical legislator. Finally, Cross argues that
polluters who are repeat-defendants have the ability to manipulate the
development of precedent, by settling cases that may turn out
unfavorably, and expending significant resources on appeal to
overturn adverse verdicts.95 Again, Cross fails to appreciate the
sophistication of the mass torts plaintiffs' bar-the same players on
both sides are repeat dealers.
Professor Cross cites a litany of studies questioning the efficiency
and viability of the common law. Those criticisms of the common law
have one flaw in common-they all view the common law as a closed
system instead of the open competition system that shapes the
common law in the United States. These criticisms of the common
law process fail to appreciate the beneficial effects of jurisdictional
competition in weeding out and correcting flaws in the common law
process. Any meaningful move toward increased reliance on the
common law would necessarily entail devolution of authority to state
governments and courts. If a state chose to rely exclusively on the
94 See Center for Legal Policy, Trial Lawyers, Inc.: A Report on the Lawsuit Industry in
America 2003, availableat http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/triallawyersinc.pdf.
95See Cross, Common Law Conceits, supra note 4, at 973 ("Litigation requires money,
and those with more money are more likely to prevail in court. Marc Galanter explained how the
"basic architecture" of the litigation process enables wealthier participants to prevail more
frequently. Special interests are able to hire better counsel and devote more hours to winning.
They are also more likely to be able to appeal and win on appeal when they lose at trial. Being
experienced in litigation and having more experienced counsel may also provide a crucial
informational advantage to repeat players, typically big businesses.") (citations omitted).
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common law, any serious mistakes would become obvious and
subject to reversal. And, in general, if a state court makes a
particularly egregious decision, the decision will not be followed in
other jurisdictions.
D. Simple Default Rules for PromotingExperimentation,Evolution
and the Reversal of Policy Mistakes
The preceding discussion provides the foundation for two simple
default rules for analyzing potential environmental problems. The
goal of these rules is to develop institutions that discover and
implement better environmental policy through experimentation,
evolution and the reversal of mistakes.
1. PresumptionofLocal Pollution and DecentralizedResponses
Most externalities are local. As discussed above, there is a great
deal of support in the literature for the presumption of decentralized
responses to predominantly local pollution.
2. UnfetteredLocal Choice of EnvironmentalPolicy Instruments
Local policymakers should have unfettered choice in selecting the
environmental policy instruments to deal with potential
environmental problems. Although this article strongly supports
greater reliance on common law environmentalism, principles of
federalism and jurisdictional competition suggest that local and state
governments should be totally free to experiment with any mix of
common law and statutory regulation.
Some practical implications of these simple rules are applied in
Part IV below.
IV. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

Advocates of using the common law to improve environmental
regulation presume the existence of a well-functioning civil justice
system to adjudicate actions in an orderly, predictable, timely, just
and cost-effective manner. With all due respect, those scholars are
living in a fantasyland. Our current civil justice system is often
criticized for frivolous lawsuits, class action abuse, junk science,
oppressive discovery, runaway juries, overzealous state attorneys
general, and so forth. Most American businesses have become very
leery of the ability of courts to reach reasonable results in major areas
of litigation. Indeed, for over two decades, business groups have
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sought federal and state96legislative solutions to alleged problems with
the civil justice system.
Industrial corporations have learned to operate within the current
environmental regulatory structure, and they are likely to fight to keep
from being thrown into the morass of class actions, discovery
motions, and jury trials that could result from increased reliance on
common law protections of the environment. The common law
process, when viewed from a distance and over-time, appears to be
orderly and relatively slow moving. Yet, to participants in the day-today rough-and-tumble of litigation, the common law process appears
to be chaotic, unjust, unpredictable, uncontrollable, punitive, and even
uninsurable (at a reasonable price).
In spite of these concerns, this Article has argued that tremendous
benefits could be reaped from a greater reliance on federalism and
common law environmentalism. This Part proposes several modest
changes in the current regulatory regime that could help capture some
of the benefits of competitive federalism, and demonstrate the
viability of state and local responses to local environmental problems.
A. Limiting the Scope of FederalEnvironmentalLaw
The presumption that pollution is local should be the default rule
for determining regulatory authority. Congress is unlikely to move in
this direction because political institutions rarely voluntarily give up
power and powerful interest groups prefer the current structure.
Nonetheless, the willingness of the Supreme Court to consider
challenges to federal authority over local activities provides an
opportunity to devolve some regulatory authority to the states.
Presumably, then, the states would have unfettered discretion in
choose the mix of legislative and common law responses to use of
environmental resources.
One ongoing battle over the scope of federal environmental law is
the issue of preemption and the question of when federal regulation
actually preempts state action.9 7 Obviously, efforts to have federal
legislation and federal regulation preempt state common law actions
often run counter to federalism principles and common law
environmentalism.

96 Most of the civil justice reform movement appears to have been a sustained push for
broad-based, systematic changes-where free-riding and industry-specific rent-seeking is less
important.
97 See FEDERAL PREEMPTION:

STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A.

Epstein and Michael S. Greve, eds.) (2007).
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This Article provides insights into three issues involving the
proper relationship between federal enforcement actions and state
common law. First, should compliance with federal environmental
regulations serve as a defense to common law actions? From the
perspective of this Article, the answer is no. If the federal regulations
do not provide for environmental standards that meet the local norms
reflected in a state's common law, then common law actions can
simultaneously improve environmental quality and environmental
regulation. However, a reasonable compromise might be to allow a
showing of compliance with federal regulations to bar a state court
from imposing punitive damages on the complying party.
Second, should there be a state common law defense to federal
environmental enforcement actions? From the perspective of this
paper, the answer is yes. If federal regulators are trying to impose
regulations on a primarily intrastate activity, the local polluters should
be allowed to prevail with a showing that the local pollution is
allowed by the state common law. In this instance, environmental
policy is improved although there may be more pollution at the local
level than would occur with federal domination.
Third, should non-compliance with federal regulations carry
weight in state common law actions? Obviously, this issue is closely
related to the second issue. However, the difference is that this issue
is addressed in state court under state law (or at least by a federal
court applying state law), while the second issue involves the
application of state law in an action under federal law. In the spirit of
federalism offered in this paper, state courts should be free to decide
on this issue in any manner they wish.98
B. Local Means Local; State Means State
The model of federalism and common law environmentalism
developed in this Article is crucially dependent upon adherence to the
matching principle that all of the consequences of a jurisdiction's
laws must be felt within that jurisdiction. Violation of this condition
is a major threat to the efficient functioning of any decentralized
system. The fact that most pollution is localized means that the
response should be local. The challenge is to constrain the response to
the size of the environmental harm.
Of course, many polluters are out-of-state corporations that own
plants in the state where they pollute. A state's forcing of an out-ofstate corporation to pay for in-state pollution does not violate the
98 To some extent, this is an evidentiary issue of whether a jury is allowed to hear
evidence of non-compliance with federal regulations.
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matching principle so long as the damages awarded are in line with
the actual in-state damages.
Of particular concern is the tendency of some jurisdictions to
dispense justice for actions remotely related to their geographic
venue. The redistributive tendencies of state courts-so famously
described by former West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard
Neely 9 9 -must be checked in order for federalism to function
properly. So-called "magic jurisdictions" and "judicial hellholes"10 0
can destroy the functioning of competitive federalism. 101
A similar phenomenon is the expanded use of public nuisance
doctrine in products liability and toxic torts cases. The lead paint
litigation in Rhode Island has been singled out as an example of
expansive and redistributive application of public nuisance law to
extract payments from out-state-corporations who bear little
relationship to the parties harmed.' O Such abuses of the public
nuisance doctrine 10 3 threaten a move towards common law
environmentalism because it unjustifiably taints the primary legal
doctrine of common law environmentalism.
State courts should be limited to awarding damages for actual instate damages caused by the local pollution. 0 4 State courts should
strictly adhere to the standards for awarding punitive damages.

99 See RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE
RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1998) ("As long as I am allowed to
redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to
do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else's money away, but so is my job
security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and there friends will reelect me.").
100Victor Schwartz, Three Key Threats to Doing Business in Our Civil Justice System and
What ATRA is Doing to Stop Them, available at http://www.legalreforminthenews.com/OpEd/OpEd-Threats-to-CiviI-Justice.html.
101Overreaching by state courts is similar to the "political externalities" discussed by Todd
Zywecki. See Zywecki, PoliticalExternalities,supra note 1.
102
Richard 0. Faulk and John S. Gray, Getting the Lead Out? The Misuse of Public
Nuisance Litigation By Public Authorities and Private Counsel, MICH. ST. L. REv.
(forthcoming).
103 See papers prepared for Searle Center Research Roundtable on "Expansion of Liability
Under Public Nuisance," April 7th-8th, 2008, Northwestern University School of Law,
Keith
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/searlecenter/conference/roundtable/index.html#public:
N. Hylton, Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law, The Economics of
Public Nuisance Law and the New Enforcement Actions; George L. Priest, John M. Olin
Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School, Market Share Liability in PersonalInjury
and Public Nuisance Litigation: An Economic Analysis; Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet
Ancel Professor of Law & Public Policy, Northwestern University School of Law, Private
ContingentFee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutionaland PoliticalImplications; David A.
Dana, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research, Northwestern University

School of Law, The Mismatch Between PublicNuisance Law and Global Warming.
104 Recent Supreme Court decisions are consistent with this view. See, e.g., BMW v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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C. Class Actions
The common law can easily and efficiently handle pollution cases
involving neighbors or small numbers of injured property owners.
However, the nature of modem industrial pollution is that it
frequently adversely impacts thousands of property owners. As
mentioned above, the class action has been developed for efficient
judicial administration, justice and deterrence.'0 5 A class action
promotes better use of judicial resources by allowing plaintiffs and
defendants to consolidate numerous claims into one trial. The class
action also makes it feasible for plaintiffs who have suffered a
relatively small harm that is generally not worth pursuing to
consolidate their claims and hire a contingent fee attorney (who
would not be willing to take on the individual cases). By providing a
means to compensate plaintiffs who otherwise would not be
compensated, the class action forces polluters to pay for their bad
acts. As such, class actions serve as a deterrent to bad acts.
From the perspective of proponents of increased reliance on the
common law, the class action is an answer to one of the biggest
arguments in favor of state or federal regulation of pollutionregulation is no longer necessary because common law courts can
handle even the largest claims. Class actions, however, create a whole
new set of problems-which are well known by legal scholars and all
major U.S. corporations.
Class action lawsuits have imposed significant costs on
defendants, which is certainly appropriate if the case is established
and the damages are appropriate. Professors Theodore Eisenberg and
Geoffrey Miller reviewed class action awards from 1993 to 2002 and
found that the average award was $139 million and that the average
award in the top ten percent of awards was $1.08 billion.'0 6 In light of
the large awards documented by Eisenberg & Miller, 10 7 it is not
surprising that the mere certification of a lawsuit as a class action
causes many companies to settle, rather than risk devastating financial
losses. As Professor George Priest explains:

5

1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
106Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
EmpiricalStudy, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004). There are several reasons to believe
that the Eisenberg-Miller numbers underestimate the true magnitude of class action judgments

and settlements. See GEORGE L. PRIEST, WHAT WE KNOW, AND DON'T KNOW ABOUT MODERN

CLASS ACTIONS: A REVIEW OF THE EISENBURG-MILLER STUDY, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE CIVIL
JUSTICE REPORT 9 (2005).
107Eisenberg & Miller, supranote 107.
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[A] principal concern regarding the operation of class actions
is that the certification of a class itself, often based upon
procedural
undemanding
satisfaction
of relatively
requirements, will bludgeon a defendant into a massive
settlement. .... Commentators unanimously concede that
virtually every mass tort class action that have been
successfully certified has settled out of court rather than been
litigated to judgment. . . We have recently observed
settlements in class actions at enormous sums of money
where there appears to be no substantive basis for defendant
liability. 108
This indictment of how the class action system operates should be
enough to give pause to even the most fervent advocates of common
law environmentalism. Companies often complain that they are
compelled to settle, even when they believe they have a good chance
of winning at trial. The benefits of the common law process are not
captured under such a system.
Class action reforms-such as interlocutory appeals of class
certification, limitation of discovery orders, and reasonable appeal
bonds-would make class actions a better instrument of common law
environmentalism. Moreover, such reforms would make a return to
common law environmentalism much more attractive to large
corporations.
D. "Junk Science"
Environmental policy should be based on sound science.
Unfortunately, many leading toxic tort cases have been based on
questionable scientific evidence. When the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.109 in
1993, it raised hopes and expectations that the quality of the scientific
evidence that reaches juries would be improved. Following Daubert,
the frequency with which testimony by experts was excluded rose, as
did the percentage of summary judgments granted against
plaintiffs. 10 In order for federalism and common law
environmentalism to improve environmental policy, it is important for
courts to faithfully fulfill their gatekeeping role by ensuring that

PRIEST,
10s

supra note 107.

M°509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10 LLOYD DIXON & BRYAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT
EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION (2002).
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expert testimony is reliable and by keeping "junk science" from the
courtroom.
CONCLUSION: WHO'S AFRAID OF COMMON LAW
ENVIRONMENTALISM?

Common law environmentalism is a legitimate complement to our
current regulatory regime. No matter how sound the arguments in
favor of common law environmentalism, the political reality is that
many interest groups have strong incentives to maintain the status
quo. National environmental groups, bureaucrats at state and federal
environmental agencies, lawyers specializing in environmental law,
and environmental law professors, all have substantial organizational
capital and human capital invested in the current system. Those
specific investments would be substantially devalued if the current
regulatory regime were dismantled.
In addition to these obvious opponents of regulatory restructuring,
industrial companies that bear the direct costs of much environmental
regulation and complain vehemently about burdensome regulation are
likely to oppose a move to the common law for the simple reason that
the return to the common law would create great uncertainty that is
beyond their control of legislative processes."' Indeed, many
companies may view themselves as beneficiaries of the current
regulatory regime. Thus, both pro-environment and pro-business
groups, as well as many lawyers and law professors, are opposed to
structural reform of environmental regulation.
Even if leaders of environmental groups become convinced that
the common law and federalism can provide better environmental
protection, they must also be convinced that it is in their interests as
organizations. It will be difficult to overcome the bureaucratic
incentives in environmental organizations to protect their turf as
dictators of environmental policy instead of actually focusing on
protecting and improving the environment.
Although there are reasons to be skeptical about Congress ever
devolving its regulatory authority to the states, it is possible that the
Supreme Court could reduce the range of federal government control.
As noted by Alexandra Klass,
Based on the Court's current willingness to scrutinize federal
regulation of seemingly local activities, there is more than a
minimal threat to federal authority over environmental
resources such as intrastate wetlands, endangered species that
Il See Zywecki,

PoliticalExternalities,supranote 1.
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do not regularly cross state lines, or individual parcels of land
that are subject to soil or groundwater contamination. While
it is too soon to know just how far the Court will go in
reigning in federal authority to regulate natural resources and
pollution on Commerce Clause or other grounds, the current
trends argue for a renewed emphasis on state law to address
pollution and natural resources concerns in the coming
years. 112
Yet, Klass recognizes13 the interest group problems inherent in a return
to the common law."
This Article argues that common law environmentalism and
federalism could help policy makers discover better environmental
policy. Actual movement toward greater reliance on these institutions
is a daunting task. As Professor Klass suggests, the Court may
advance the change. This would appear to be a more likely prospect
than the environmental establishment admitting that the current
system is failing and calling for greater reliance on the common law.

112Klass, Common Law and Federalism,supra note 6, at 579.

1131d. at 579, n. 198 ("This judicial trend toward devolving power from the federal
government to the state governments contrasts with recent federal efforts by the executive
branch and certain members of Congress to use federal law to preempt efforts by injured parties
to recover damages associated with pesticides, prescription drugs and other products under state
tort law").

